n the early 2020s, Germany faced a crisis of its strategic presence on the global stage, first of all in the Near and Middle East and in North Africa. One of the ways to compensate for these losses was to establish a presence in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR), where confrontation between the United States, its allies, and China has intensified. The article explores relations with Japan in the sphere of security and defense as a means of strengthening Germany’s positions in the IPR. The current German attempt to establish such a presence is the third historically. The first attempt (late nineteenth to early twentieth centu ry) and the second (in the run-up to and the early stages of World War II) demonstrated the particular importance of Japanese support, or its absence. This awareness has been reflected at both the doctrinal level (in the “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific Region,” 2020) and the practical level. The article examines the features of bilateral political and diplomatic contacts, above all the launch of the intergovernmental consultations format (March 2023). This was preceded by the “2+2” format (meetings of the foreign and defense ministers). The use of this format by Germany with Japan and Australia is compared. When the Bundeswehr sent a frigate to the IPR (2021), the Self-Defense Forces became its main partner in the maneuvers. Cooperation continued during the air force mission Rapid Pacific 2022, but the volume of the Federal Republic of Germany’s arms and military equipment exports to the country has been limited. In conclusion, the role of Japan as a conduit for Germany’s inte- rests in the region is demonstrated.
Indo-Pacific region; strategic presence; intergovernmental consultations; “2+2” format; Bundeswehr; Far East; Germany; Japan.