The article examines the problems of the initial stage of a large-scale campaign to accelerate the production of meat and milk, initiated by the party and state leadership of the USSR under N.S. Khrushchev. Based on an analysis of regional sources, the study investigates the specifics of implementing ambitious plans in the agricultural sector of the Middle Volga region, in particular the Kuibyshev and Ulyanovsk regions. The objective difficulties and contradictions faced by public enterprises in implementing the designated course are revealed. It is noted that the country’s leadership’s reliance on the moral and volitional qualities of the people was not grounded in economic calculations or in a realistic assessment of agriculture’s capacity. The rate of increase in cattle numbers and productivity did not correspond to the state of the material and technical base of collective farms and state farms. Low herd reproduction rates and high livestock mortality resulted from unsanitary conditions and dilapidated premises. It was found that the food supply was unbalanced, characterized by a shortage of roughage and concentrated feeds. The weak mechanization of farms had a considerable influence on agricultural production processes. It is noted that in 1958, the policy of restrictions on personal subsidiary farming had a negative impact on the state of the meat and dairy sector. Despite a certain increase in livestock numbers compared to the initial period of the “thaw”, the plans of 1957–1958 for meat and milk production in the Middle Volga regions went unfulfilled. Following the failures of the first stage of the campaign in 1958, the Soviet leadership shifted from voluntary methods to increasing administrative pressure on public farms, thereby laying the groundwork for the deepening of crisis phenomena in the country’s agriculture.
Agrarian policy; animal husbandry; meat‑and‑dairy campaign; N.S. Khrushchev; Middle Volga region; kolkhozes; sovkhozes; material and technical base.