The article analyzes problems related to the definition of the concept of «rules» on which the world order is based, concerning the doctrine of «international rules-based order », from the point of view of the general theory of law and the theory of general international law. Special attention is paid to the concept and types of social norms, the concept of the international regulatory system, the supremacy of the norms of law in it, the concepts of public order, legal order, and the types of world order (the world public order, the world (international) legal order, and the global world legal order). The article substantiates that these are exclusively the norms of international law that legally bind social norms among all kinds of the international legal system norms. In contrast, the only legally binding norms of international law for all states and other actors of international interstate relations are exclusively the jus cogens norms, i.e., norms of the general international law. Therefore, the conclusion was made that all the requirements of the «rules» concept existing within the doctrine of the «rules-based world order» of all types of social norms of the international regulatory system correspond exclusively to the abovementioned norms of international law. The main conclusion of the article is that the doctrine of the international rules-based order, substantiating the existence of specific rules of conduct, which are not the norms of international law, but at the same time are legally binding for all states, in fact, is directed at the refusal from the universally acknowledged supremacy of international law in the regulation of international (interstate) relations. It aims to either transform the already existing international legal norms or, when it comes to the global world order, cancel or change the fundamental international legal norms jus cogens of the general international law.
rules-based international order; international regulatory system; the supremacy of law; world order; jus cogens norms.